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In this article on imitation and violence I wish to interpret violent 
relations between human beings as founded on imitation of each other 
desires. (A desire for what other people desire.) Imitation, the desire to have 
what other people desire, is both the root to success and the root to violence. 
The article is inspired by the French philosopher, René Girard’s (1923-2015) 
theory on imitative desire. In my view, societies are continually threatened 
by violent imitation, and, at the same time, imitation is the factor which 
creates dynamic societies and cultures. Human beings are driven by desiring 
what other people desire, by wanting what others want. The challenge is to 
be able to create a society where one can freely follow one’s imitative 
desires and, at the same time, prevent violence. Desire today is, because 
violence is less accepted, manifest in a less physically violent way than 
before. Nonetheless, desire today creates scapegoats in a more psychological 
manner. 
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Aim 
In this article I wish to discuss the relation between imitation 
(mimesis) and violence by combining the cultural theory of René Girard with 
the anthropological insights of Marcel Mauss. My aim is to show that the 
source of violence lies in an acute desire to have what others have. This is a 
universal phenomenon, which is becoming more and more acute as 
prohibitions in traditional societies are waning and the freedom to act on 
one’s desires is more and more common. 
 
From Friend to Foe 
The reason why mimesis is so closely associated with violence is that 
it easily leads to rivalry. Violence always seems to be mingled with desire, 
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and, even if it is ‘righteous’, a response to some kind of injustice, violence is 
often located in some sort of rivalry.42  
Terms such as “imitation”, “identification”, and “comparison” do not 
have to turn out to be violent – even when a great deal of competition is 
involved. In this respect, I disagree with they who say that imitative desire 
must be violent, thus restoring an insight going back to Heraclitus that 
violence is the source of all.43 The all-decisive factor is the shift from 
competition to rivalry, from being allies to becoming enemies. The transition 
from being competitive friends to rivals comes as a result of imitation. Thus, 
imitative desire is the generative force behind violence, the snake that turns 
friends and lovers into rivals.  
 
Reciprocal Violence 
Traditional societies tried, and often very successfully, to protect 
individuals through prohibitions and taboos. These prohibitions and taboos 
were directed against any kind of activity which could possibly unleash 
violent rivalry. The killing of adulterers, thieves and foreigners can be seen 
as a way of ridding society of pollution, and cleansing it from the potential 
imitation of bad desires. In this way a society’s violence functions in a 
protective and anti-mimetic way. The violence against transgressors is a kind 
of mimetic anti-mimesis, a way of telling people to follow the rules of 
society so that they would become mimetically immune to the forces that 
threaten society.  
Violent victimizing appears to fulfil a generative function by 
preventing transgressions, ‘cleansing’ morally and restoring peace. But, at 
the same time, it bears (unconsciously for the participants) a similarity to 
what one wishes to expel, namely the feared violence and pollution of the 
person(s) victimized. Despite attempts to expel violent transgressions, the 
attempts themselves are quite similar to the violence they are trying to 
exorcise. Both Freud and Girard have seen that those who conduct a rite of 
sacrifice are projecting onto the sacrificial victim qualities that reflect some 
of their own innermost concerns.44 
                                                            
42 In cases where injustice and exploitation have been done against a community, desires are 
often initially sparked by the exploiters. This rivalry can also be manifested as rivalry among 
the exploiters, which is then materialized into further exploitation and easily calls for 
violence among the exploited victims, because of the rivalistic desires among the 
persecutors. 
43 Robert G. Hamerton-Kelly. The Gospel and the Sacred, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1994, 132. 
44 Jurgensmeyer.(Ed) ‘Is Symbolic Violence Related to Real Violence?’ in Violence and the 
Sacred in the Modern World , London: Franc Cass, 1992, 3. 
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In demolishing the victim they are symbolically annihilating aspects 
of themselves. What is destroyed is destructiveness itself: the feelings of 
violence and hostility that lie behind attempts to carry out violent activities. 
Such feelings are antithetical to the ties of friendship that bond a community 
together, and feelings of violence towards one’s peers and associates must 
be banished if a closely knit community – such as a tribal brotherhood, a 
spiritual fellowship, or a modern nation – is to survive. (Jurgensmeyer. ‘Is 
Symbolic Violence Related to Real Violence?’ in Violence and the Sacred in 
the Modern World, London: Franc Cass, 1992, 3.) 
Sacrificial violence, seen from a modern, non-sacrificial standpoint, 
is a kind of suicide. By killing the other, one also kills something in oneself. 
Modern societies are full of these projections of one’s own desires onto the 
other, which expose the modern variant of sacrifice and which are often less 
physically and more psychologically violent yet still victimizing in their 
attitude of projecting.  
This Freudian act of projection resembles the act of doubling, the 
intense mimesis of the other that creates doubles.  From a Girardian 
perspective it is double desire that leads to violence.45 The imitation of each 
other’s desires will sooner or later lead to rivalry, and then to violence.46 
This doubling does not only have to involve two people; it can be two 
groups, two countries. But the effect is always negative. Raymund Schwager 
explains it in the following terms. 
Whoever is desirous has to expect that the others will too. Whoever 
succumbs to rivalry arouses the same passion in others. Whoever resorts to 
violence is imitated in his or her actions until, sooner or later, the deed falls 
back upon his or her own head. (Raymund Schwager. Must There be 
Scapegoats?, N.Y./Herefordshire: The Crossroad P.C./Gracewing,2000, 81.) 
This excellent description of reciprocal violence shows just how 
inevitable the escalation of violence is. There is something organic in 
mimetic rivalry; the contamination is so strong that the way out of violent 
conflicts seems to require a change of heart, an act of forgiveness in order to 
stop the never-ending cycle. The process of violence, as we can see, is only 
different variations on the structure and strength of desire. It is the desire 
between the subject and the desired person in different configurations. And 
the initial objects, such as for example money, which started the rivalry, 
                                                            
45 ‘Mimesis and Violence’ in The Girard Reader, Ed. James Williams). NY: The Crossroad 
Publishing Company, 
1996, 12. 
46 “The more a tragic conflict is prolonged, the more likely it is to culminate in a violent 
mimesis; the resemblance between combatants grow ever stronger until each presents a 
mirror image of the other.” (René Girard. Violence and the Sacred, (5th Ed.), Maryland 
Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986, 47. 
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seems to get lost in the turmoil. Girard explains this escalation of violence as 
an increase in resistance. 
The more desire is attached to resistance the more it is oriented 
towards violence. (René Girard. Things Hidden, since the Foundation 
of the World, London: Athlone Press. 1987, 334.) 
According to mimetic theory, there is little rationality in violence 
because, in exactly the same way as in rivalistic love, violence seems to be 
motivated less and less by any object, and more and more focused on 
reciprocal violence. There is, of course, a rationality attached to the balance, 
the reciprocity, but the objects, which are usually seen to introduce and 
motivate violence, gradually become less motivational. 
Any object at stake in conflict will ultimately be annulled and 
surpassed, and acquisitive mimesis, which sets members of the 
community against one another, will give way to antagonistic 
mimesis, which eventually unites and reconciles all members of a 
community at the expense of a victim. (Girard. Things Hidden, 95.) 
This rivalry towards nothingness is marvellously illustrated in the 
movie, American Psycho, based on Ellis’ novel, showing how a young New 
York yuppie can become a serial-killer. In one scene the young and 
successful New York businessmen begin rivalling about which of their 
business card is the most slick & subtle. The protagonist, Patrick Bateman, 
gets sick with envy and reacts by committing his first murder. This is 
actually one of the best examples on desire according to the other’s desire, 
as there is absolutely nothing real at stake, only desire.   
Thus imitation is the force which both begins and ends violence. And 
in this respect imitation is primary to violence. First there is mimesis; 
violence then stems from the inevitable conflicts aroused by mimetic desire. 
In this respect violence is always caused by imitative desire. Violence is not 
originary. It is a by-product of imitative desire.47  
Violence is mimetic rivalry itself becoming violent as the antagonists 
who desire the same object keep thwarting each other and desiring 
the object all the more. Violence is supremely mimetic. (‘Mimesis and 
Violence’ in The Girard reader (Ed. James Williams). NY: The 
Crossroad Publishing Company, 1996, 12-13.) 
If there were a violent inclination in human beings, violence would 
have been instinctual and one would not label it as violence. Calling it 
violence means that the killing is not instinctual but is related to moral 
problems. The specificity concerning humans and killing is this lack of 
ability to kill without consequences, and without the accompanying moral 
and religious implications. This is the result of an expanded imitation. 
                                                            
47 ‘Mimesis and Violence. Perspectives in Cultural Criticism’ in The Girard Reader, 12. 
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Human violence has no braking mechanisms against intra-specific 
aggression. This means, according to Burton L. Mack, that rivalries and 
conflicts, once unleashed, cannot stop short of manslaughter.48 According to 
Girard, the growth of violence among human beings is a result of imitative 
activity linked to the increase in brain size.49 This does not mean that human 
nature has become more violent, on the contrary, but it does mean that 
increased intelligence makes violence more effective and far-reaching. Also, 
the fact that human beings have no instinctual stoppage mechanism makes 
violence complex and seemingly irrational because of the vast range of 
violent expressions caused by the variations in conflictual mimesis. 
When discussing imitation in relation to violence, almost all 
variations of violent imitation can be labelled acquisitive. There is a 
tendency to interpret imitation as representation, especially when the level of 
conflict is low. If, however, the level of conflict rises, it would seem that 
everything revolves around acquisition. Thus imitation should be related to 
the desire to acquire goods, not least to obtain things which are difficult to 
obtain. But Girard only follows up to a certain point economists who 
attribute violence to the scarcity of essential objects,50 as the connection 
between scarcity and violence is relative. In some cases there is only a minor 
degree of scarcity before there is violence, and in other cases there is no 
scarcity whatsoever. This means that the relation between violence and 
scarcity must be understood in the context of desire rather than in relation to 
the scarcity itself. Girard, however, has never related his understanding of 
imitation to a real discussion related to the scarcity of goods. Clearly, 
scarcity is taken into consideration too little in mimetic theory, especially in 
the global perspective. This might possibly be because it would weaken his 
mimetic theory. The external desires due to scarcity of food and other goods 
are, in certain areas of the world, motivated by the desires to survive and not 
by metaphysical desire. Mimetic desire, when not confined to desires in the 
Western world, would, I suppose, become less related to internal mediation, 
as the individual in most parts of the world is more regulated by sacrificial 
institutions.  
 
Violence and Desire in Myth 
Mimesis and violence play such an important role in understanding of 
myths that without the presence of violence and imitation, a myth would not 
be a myth, but either a straightforward true story, or a fairy tale. Instead of 
seeing the homogenity of myth in common textual structures, like Lévi-
                                                            
48 Burton L. Mack. ‘The Innocent Transgressor: Jesus in Early Christian Myth and History,’ 
Semeia 33 (1985): 139. 
49 Girard. Things Hidden, 94-95. 
50 The Girard Reader, 10. 
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Strauss, 51 Girard sees the homogenity of myth in the violence from which it 
stems and tries to hide. Myths try to cover up the violence which has been 
inflicted by divinizing the violence and transcribing the events in such a way 
that the violence of the society is not revealed as such.52 Myths function in a 
society both as legitimation and preservation.53  In this way Girard’s 
understanding of myth corresponds to that of Durkheim when the latter 
claims myths hide more than they reveal.54 According to Girard, one cannot 
trust the myth’s message, one has to uncover layers of mythology in the 
myths to discover the real accounts hidden in myths.55 Golsan, in  his book 
on Girard and myth, writes that while Girard ‘shares the view that myths are 
not precise accounts of historical occurrences, he does argue that they 
originate in real or historical events.’56 Thus, one of the most important 
features in Girard’s understanding of myths is that there are real events 
behind sacrifices.57 Despite his suspicion about the messages of myth, Girard 
believes they refer to violent historical events. 
All myths...have their roots in real acts of violence against real 
victims. (René Girard. The Scapegoat, Baltimore, Maryland: The 
Johns Hopkins University U.P., 1986, 25.) 
One of Girard's main hermeneutical challenges has been to find out 
how myth was transcribed.58  The attempt seems extremely hypothetical, 
built on an extraordinary confidence in modern rationalism as a tool with 
which to demythologize the non-violent cover-up. The hermeneutics of 
suspicion is so acute that Girard actually claims that myth basically tells the 
opposite of what really happened. This claim is only possible when seen 
from a non-sacrificial standpoint, where the sacrificer’s point of view is 
questioned. The view that myths will always, in some way or another, refer 
to some kind of sacrificial event, differs dramatically from Levi Strauss’ 
concept of myth as language without any necessary referentiality. The 
sacrifices or murders are the events from which the myths are compiled. 
Mythology partly distorts this reality, often by turning it into fantastic events, 
which shows a certain inability to cope with violence. Violence engenders 
                                                            
51 Claude Lévi-Strauss. Myth and Meaning , New York: Schocken Books, 1995. See chapter  
four ‘When Myth Becomes History’. See also‘The Structural study of myth’ in T.A. Sebeok. 
Myth – A Symposium, Bloomington: Indiana U.P., 1958, 83-84. 
52 See Girard. The Scapegoat, 23-99. 
53 Mariasusai Dhavamony. Phenomenology of Religion, Rome: Gregorian U.P., 1973, 140. 
54 Ivan Strenski. Four Theories of Myth in Twentieth century History, Houndmills: 
Macmillan, 1987, 138. 
55 See Girard. The Scapegoat, 23-99. 
56 Golsan. René Girard and Myth. An Introduction, New York & London: Garland 
Publishing, 1993, 61. 
57 The Girard Reader, 12. 
58 See Chapter 6, 7 and 8 in The Scapegoat. 
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myths, and turns the real events into something fantastic. As in a war, the 
real facts are censored. Violence distorts reality, and myths are one way of 
doing away with or transforming the actual events. At the same time, myths 
are often the only source for uncovering the events narrated, and it is through 
a suspicious reading that one can decipher the reality behind myths. This 
process of being able to go behind the myths to discover remnants of real 
events, reveals Girard’s belief in a structural thinking which is not governed 
by desire. 
Myths are linked to sacrificial crises and thus to violence. The most 
important function of myth is to establish a sacred reality.59 The mythmakers 
are imitators of the norms of society; they are a kind of spiritual storyteller 
who produces myths within which a society can function. Both myths and 
rituals are rationalizations of the sacrificial crises that threaten to make their 
society dissolving into violence.  
Myths are the retrospective transfiguration of sacrificial crisis, the 
reinterpretation of these crises in the light of the cultural order that 
has arisen from them. (René Girard. Violence and the Sacred, (5th 
Ed.), Maryland Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986, 
64.) 
 
Myth and Ritual 
Myths come into play following the sacrificial crises, and are 
interpretations of the mimetic turmoil which a society has gone through. But 
because the mythmakers imitate the norms of society, and tell/write from a 
society’s victimizing point of view, the act of copying is not drawn from the 
events themselves. There is actually an anti-mimetic tendency concerning the 
real event, which explains the blurred report of reality. The act which should 
be imitated is the act of divinization, which is enacted through ritual. 
Mimetic theory, when considering myths should, in my view, embrace 
Malinowski’s claim that the power of myths does not stem from the 
collective force, but rather from the imitation of each other.60 This, as I see 
it, is going one step beyond a sociological reference when looking for the 
source of myths in mimetic desire. Ritual is a symbolic imitation of the 
events (sacrifice) as described in the myths.61 In this respect there is a much 
                                                            
59 Dhavamony. Phenomenology of Religion, 150. 
60 Strenski. Four Theories on Myth in Twentieth century History, 52. 
61 Girard seems, in Violence and the Sacred, to agree with the anthropologists Hubert and 
Mauss in dismissing relating myth to ritual, and ritual to myth. (See Violence and the 
Sacred, 90). But as far as I can see, this is exactly what he does in his analysis of sacrifice as 
the centre in myth and ritual. (Violence and the Sacred, 90-96.) In later works he more or 
less admits this: In an article called ‘From Ritual to Science’ Girard writes: ‘Far from 
opposing rites from myth, as is done today, we must bring them together as was always done 
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simpler imitation to ritual. Ritual re-enacts the mimetic crisis and the 
transformation brought through by the victimage mechanism. This theory is 
not new though; already in the book Myth and Ritual: Essays on the Myth 
and Ritual of the Hebrews in Relation to the Culture Pattern of the Ancient 
East, published in 1933, myth is seen to be the story which the ritual 
enacts.62 In this way ritual does not necessarily imitate the real acts, but the 
acts described in the myths. Ritual is a mimetic representation of myths. (It 
can also, possibly, be the other way round: myths can be imitations of 
rituals.)63 Ritual can be seen to be a rationalized, simplified and purified 
version of myths. One could say that myths transcribe and transform violent 
imitation. In ritual, the violent imitation is often removed when the violent 
acts are represented. Rituals seem, more openly, to represent the official 
version of the myths. Therefore, in rituals the censor’s position is much 
weaker, because the myths have already censored the events. The myths 
have already done away with the original violence, while the rituals present 
the crisis in order to emphasize the way out of chaos into a new, 
differentiated existence. Therefore, the imitation of the sacrifice through 
ritual is also largely preventive.64 The attempt (in myth) to hide violence 
may be seen as the desire to establish a mythic representation. The act of 
purging the myth of its acquisitive and raw origin, is simultaneously an act of 
turning myths into representations of violence, not of violence in itself. This 
again underlines my view that representation is often established to moderate 
mimetic violence. But in so doing, it runs the risk of covering up the real 
violence.  
 
The Anti-Mimetic Tendency in Myth 
Myths are anti-mimetic towards the actual violent events, because 
they are restricted by the sanctions of society. Myths tend, just like rituals, to 
legitimate society. In this respect the killing (narrated in myth) is 
transformed. When claiming that there is an anti-mimetic tendency in myth, I 
mean that the myth, based on the persecutor’s point of view, is usually 
                                                                                                                                                        
before. We must recognize in the rite the operation of mythological speech, but without 
seeking to make the latter the original of the former, or vice versa. The original is 
elsewhere.’ (Girard. ‘From Ritual to Science,’in Configurations, Johns Hopkins U.P., 2000, 
172-173.)  
62 Blackman/Hooke. Myth and Ritual: Essays on the Myth and Ritual of the Hebrews in 
Relation to the Culture Pattern of the Ancient East (London: Oxford U.P., 1933), 3. 
63 According to Walter Burkert, ritual probably is far older in the history of evolution than 
myths since it goes back even to animals. (Walter Burkert. Homo Necans, Berkeley Los 
Angeles London: University of California 
Press, 1983, 31.) 
64 Violence and the Sacred, 102. 
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written from the standpoint of a warning, of not enacting the violence. This 
is clearly the case regarding tragic myths, for example the Oedipus-myth. On 
the other hand, there are myths which require imitation. Myths of fertility, 
for example, clearly require imitation, as this fertility must be renewed. 
Girard’s understanding of myth only considers violent myths.  
For Girard myths are not basically concerned with identity and 
world-explanation, rather they function as a way of upholding society by 
means of a cover-up. Myths do not encourage violence. On the contrary, they 
seek to hide the real violence. (Therefore they are mythical.) But, on the 
other hand, they do not intentionally reveal violence either. Rather, they 
indicate violence. Myths are violent in that they try to hide the persecutor’s 
violence. The violence is the act of writing from the persecutor’s point of 
view.  Myth, despite its violent norms, hides a society’s guilt at having killed 
the victim(s). It is this urge to hide the murder which makes myths anti-
mimetic, and, usually, does not directly encourage violence. Nevertheless, 
such cover-up myths are violent in that they legitimate the killing (despite 
rewriting the cause). Myths, as they are written from a society’s point of 
view, are mimetic in the way that they seem to propagate and uphold the 
norms of the persecutors in a society. Thus, violent events are not described 
from a totally non-mimetic point of view; rather, mimesis is primarily based 
on the mimesis of society, and the events can only be made mimetically 
acceptable when transformed by these norms. Myths are representational as 
regards the events, but the mimesis that dictates the myth is secondary, 
engendered by the norms of society. When historical ‘reality’ becomes 
transformed into myths (and rituals), it becomes mimetically acceptable.65 In 
fact myth and ritual represent the community’s cultural foundation. But 
myth, compared to ritual, is usually more complex textually, so there will 
always be room for heretical presentations of a society’s myths, even if this 
is more an option for the modern scholar than for the individual in a 
traditional society, regulated as the latter is by a set of rigid norms. However, 
taking this heretical possibility into consideration, I would agree with Lévi-
Strauss (against Girard) that myths have a more individualized tendency than 
rituals.66 The myths presented from the persecutor’s point of view may be 
                                                            
65 According to Gebauer and Wulf, the great problem in Girard’s understanding of myths is 
that Girard claims that all myths of cultural origins are encoded representations of real 
events in which order is established as the result of originally violent acts. Gebauer and 
Wulf claim that there is little basis for locating any original event: ‘(...) the analysis of the 
mythical series of events as crisis of the religious institutions is undertaken in regard to a 
text that does not exist, but must first be produced. The extant mythical texts are 
systematically distorted; they must be read anew with the distortion filtered out.’ (Gebauer 
& Wulf.  Mimesis, California: University of California Press, 1995, 262.) 
66 See Claude Lévi-Strauss. The Raw and the Cooked, London: Jonathan Cape, 1970, 53. 
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seen as an attempt to hide the acquisitive tendency in the original. The 
mythmakers, however, expose and rewrite the events as representations of 
reality. In this way the mythic texts need to be demythologized in order to be 
seen as myths. By questioning the representation, the acquisitive dimension 
in myth suddenly exposes itself beneath the layers of representation. This is 
evident in the representations of the Passion where the death of Jesus is 
described as violent and sides with the victim against the aggressors. The 
aggressor’s violence cannot easily be mythologized. 
Demythologization in mimetic theory is based on the victim’s 
revelation of violence. The victim's revelation of violence can only be a 
revelation so long as there is the understanding that the victim is innocent. 
By means by which Girard deconstructs myths is reflection on the Passion 
narrative. Through the Gospel stories of Jesus’ innocence, the innocence of 
other passions and sacrificial deaths is illuminated. However, this 
intertextuality is hidden in Girard's work. He never explicitly tells the readers 
where he is speaking from. In Things Hidden he claims that he does not care 
to know where he is speaking from.67 But now, as the theory seems to be 
fully developed and the Christian roots are more to the fore, the Passion 
drama plainly seems to be the main hermeneutical tool upon which the 
theory rests. This is, of course, more directly evident in relation to the 
scapegoat mechanism than to violence and myth. But if Girard had not seen 
violence and myth from a non-sacrificial Passion-perspective, he would 
probably not have had such a negative view on both.   
Both myth and rituals must, in mimetic theory, be seen in the context 
of desire. The urge to hide desires means disregarding mimesis. Especially 
myth can be seen to be desirous; both in transforming the victim and in 
covering up of violence.  
 
Acquisition and Rivalry 
Mauss: Anthropology and Rivalry  
Let us shift the perspective from myth to conflict, in order to grasp 
the acquisitive dimension in violence. Conflict can be seen as an initial stage 
of violence. In psychology, sociology and anthropology mimesis is 
understood, more than in philosophy and religion, as acquisitive mimesis, an 
acquisition which also is based upon the other. Marcel Mauss’ work, The 
Gift, illustrates the acquisitive basis of human societies in a most intriguing 
way. The strength of Mauss work (a work on how primitive societies are 
governed by the laws of exchange) lies in the emphasis he puts on rivalry in 
the act of exchange. Mauss shows that all kinds of gifts (within the societies 
he has researched, mainly Polynesian) are based on a system of reciprocity. 
                                                            
67 Girard. Things Hidden, 435.  
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This reciprocity, which governs different kinds of exchange, clearly contains 
acquisitive elements. The balancing of accounts can contain virtually 
anything. This indicates a system of imitative reciprocity. Imitation 
contained in the receiving of a gift in an attitude of reciprocity, establishes a 
bind towards each other. This double nature is, as Mauss writes, already 
inherent in the word gift, which in Germanic languages can mean both a gift 
(present) and a poison.68 In receiving a gift all kinds of obligations are 
required. In this respect, reciprocal imitation means surrendering to the laws 
of society. Also religious sacrifices are built upon a principle of reciprocity. 
When there is reciprocity, the system, according to its own laws, is governed 
by good mimesis. And when there is some kind of breach, bad imitation is 
always near at hand. Among the Polynesian clans refusing to give, failing to 
invite, or refusing to accept, is tantamount to declaring war, indicating that 
violence is near at hand whenever there is a breach in reciprocity.69 Mauss 
writes in his Conclusion that throughout a considerable period of time, in a 
considerable number of societies (up until modern times) there was no 
middle way: either one trusts completely or distrusts completely, either one 
gives everything or one goes to war.70 The rivalry is not only limited to 
necessities, there is rivalry in all spheres, not least in the act of generosity; 
the will to outdo the other with presents and feasts71 is also imbued with the 
same mimetic rivalry.  
Mauss talks about the ability to attract and dazzle the other person.72 
At certain potlatches there is a rivalry over who is the richest and the most 
madly extravagant. Mauss clearly perceives rivalry in generosity, and 
cunningly concludes that ‘everything is based upon the principles of 
antagonism and rivalry.’73 In some instances there is a violent transcending 
of the reciprocal system of giving and returning gifts. Instead of a controlled 
reciprocal imitation, there is a shift towards a chaotic imitation where one 
destroys in order not to give the slightest hint of desiring one’s gift to be 
reciprocated. Mauss gives an example from the American Northwest where 
houses and thousands of blankets are burnt, and the most valuable copper 
objects are broken and thrown into the water ‘in order to ‘flatten’ one’s 
rival.’74 This indicates a development from a rational and upholding 
imitation based on reciprocity, to a violent, almost apocalyptic frenzy. In 
such cases it is insufficient to restrict imitation to reciprocity. Mimesis based 
                                                            
68 Marcel Mauss. The Gift (London, N.Y.: Routledge, 1990), 81. 
69 Ibid., 17. 
70 Ibid., 104-105. 
71 Ibid., 20. 
72 Ibid., 36. 
73 Ibid., 47. 
74 Ibid., 47. 
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on exchange is only one part of imitative desire. The more destructive 
examples given by Mauss indicate the metaphysical and non-materialistic 
forces in human societies. As long as there is reciprocity, everything is fine. 
But a breach in etiquette, a lack of honour (which is probably more important 
in primitive societies than in modern ones)75 transforms the rationality of a 
mimetically based exchange system into destructive forms, indicating that 
acquisitive mimesis can mean something more and something worse than 
mere imitation based upon exchange. The system of gifts, of exchange, has a 
balancing function, but its reasons and its dialectical nature are far from 
rational. 
Mauss’ research is limited to particular cultures, but, as he indicates, 
many of these phenomena or mechanisms have something universal about 
them.76  He claims that it is possible to extend his observations to our own 
societies.77 In fact, it is difficult to find anything more universal than rivalry 
and violence even if the forms vary greatly. The strength of Mauss’ research 
lies in the way he sees the rivalistic tendency in all kinds of exchange,78 and 
therefore regards rivalry as something inevitable. Mauss’ work on exchange 
clearly corresponds to the acquisitive nature of imitation and human 
coexistence. 
 
The Economy of Rivalry 
Girard does not limit rivalry to any specific object. Even something 
totally insignificant as a stick can cause rivalry and end up as something 
sacred if it becomes something desireable for a group of people. Girard, 
however, emphasizes rivalry in love, which indicates this special area as 
being potentially rivalistic.79 According to both Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Derrida, imitative desire has always been a problem in relation to money and 
economy. When the economy is a part of the picture, there are possibilities for 
both rivalry and hatred, Lacoue-Labarthe writes.80 Economy, alongside love, is 
the most common ground for rivalry. Economic rivalry, in its initial stages, has 
something clearly rational about it; for example, when applying for a job. If I 
don’t persuade the committee that I can do a better job than the other applicants, I 
will be without work, meaning I will have less money, less social contact, a less 
                                                            
75 Ibid., 48. 
76 Ibid., 59. 
77 Ibid., 83. 
78 Mauss’ attempt to synthesize and show certain universal traits in his research actually 
corresponds to Girard’s approach. There is, however, a tendency in Girard’s work not to 
mention those critics with whom he is in tune. Instead his texts are written against a 
background of adversaries. 
 
80 Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe. Typography: mimesis, philosophy, politics, Cambr. Mass.: 
Harvard U.P, 1989, 124. 
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bright future and so on. Economic rivalry in its initial stages is a kind of rationale 
for survival, a survival arising from a scarcity of goods and scarcity of jobs.  
 
Metaphysical Desire 
When, however, rivalry is not based on survival, but on prestige, it 
becomes a part of metaphysical desire, a desire based on the other, on having a 
more exclusive car, house, boat than the other. The objective value, if one can 
use such a term, plays an entirely secondary role; the aim is to beat the rival in an 
on-going economic race where things play a symbolic and highly decisive role. 
In economic rivalry, when scarcity is the problem, rivalry seems profound, and 
when we analyse the relationship between the economy and mimesis, money is 
very easily transformed into the cause of rivalry. The interesting fact is that it is 
the initial, more rational stages of economic rivalry that are the most violent. The 
scarcity of jobs, food or other goods will often spark off violence, while using the 
economy to enhance prestige, is, in a modern society at least, not directly violent, 
even if this kind of rivalry creates scapegoats among the rivals who do not make 
it, and also exploits suffering people in the Third World to an even greater 
degree.81  
 
Rivalry, Christianity and Capitalism 
From an historical point of view desire has become more acute. Even 
if firms manage to create a rivalistic atmosphere towards other firms, all 
kinds of internal rivalries may arise within a group. This tendency is clearly 
not new, but the individuality stemming from the sacrificial breakdown, has 
made rivalry more internal, less clear cut, less based on collective desires. 
The sacrificial breakdown which clearly moderates violence, however, 
produces more subdued, individual versions of expulsion. When the illusive 
balance between us and them crumbles, rivalry creeps into all private areas 
such as families, friendships, rivalry with relatives and colleagues and so on, 
leaving no stone unturned, unless there are prohibitions and ethical norms to 
stop the rivalry creeping in and disintegrating the smallest social entities. 
This makes ethics and, in moderate forms, prohibitions so acute in 
the modern world. Without the sacrificial checking and balancing of our 
desires, desires threaten to rule the making of the world. Religion often 
questions different forms of desire, helping people quit desires which do 
violence towards the self and the other.  But Christian mimesis, an imitation 
of Christ in the Western world, does not seem to propagate prohibitions 
against rivalry in itself. Violence brought about by the freedom to rival 
                                                            
81 Although suffering people in the Third World are only indirectly a part of the 
metaphysical rivalry in the Western world, they become, partly, when considering the 
economic systems, the scapegoats of our metaphysically motivated mass consume. 
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anyone and leading sometimes to a scapegoating, where people fall out of 
competitive niches, can, in fact, be seen as a modern form of victimizing. 
From such a point of view, the imitation of Christ consists in the Christian 
part of the world in seeing Christ in any victim, either brought about by 
rivalry or, more indirectly, by the market mechanism. The encouragement of 
this relatively new global ideology seems to create victims out of a market 
system where the most brilliant, the most lucky and, at times, the most brutal 
possess the greatest value. 
 
Conclusion 
Violence must be seen as stemming from the desire to have what 
others have. In the past violence was moderated by systems of prohibitions 
and taboos. Today prohibitions and taboos are clearly weakened, allowing 
the individual to act on his or her desires in ways which was unthinkable in 
previous times. The imitation of Christ has, through history, created a softer 
society by emphasizing forgiveness and love of one’s neighbour. The 
freedom to imitate and follow one’s desires has, at the same time, created a 
freedom to compete in all areas. This is becoming global. The freedom to 
imitate seems to create an extremely dynamic society and, at the same time, 
creates a society where the individual is continually trapped by the effects of 
desires, making him fall prey to illusion and deceit.  
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